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Engineering Leadership 
 
 
Mike Murphy and Eugene Coyle 
 
 
Abstract: By 1921 the American sociologist Thorstein Veblen in his book The Engi-
neers and the Price System argued for a technocracy in which the welfare of humanity 
would be entrusted to the control of the engineers because they alone were competent to 
understand the complexities of the industrial system and processes and thereby optimize 
and maximize its output. This chapter sets out to explore the extent to which Veblen’s 
technocratic leadership thesis has come to pass. We first review the role of the engineer 
in society and in the context of Europe, the US and China, and examine the influence of 
the engineering profession on the management and economic welfare of nations. Second 
we review trends in engineering education and formation in Europe, China and the US, 
and the substantive developmental role of the Grand Écoles in 18th-century France. A 
comparison is made between the economies of Ireland and China, in the context of their 
recent economic performance.  Third a review of commentary on the interconnectedness 
of world economies and shift in economic power from nineteenth century United King-
dom market dominance to twentieth century United States supremacy and to present day 
emergence of China as the world’s second largest and fastest growing economy, is made 
in the context of the role of engineering leadership. We finally ponder whether a hybrid 
political environment, with blending of meritocracy with technocratic leadership and 
moderated by non-engineering influences, might be a recipe for sustained economic 
success of nations.   
 
 
Keywords: technocratic leadership, engineering profession, engineering education, po-
litical economy, captains of finance 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The material welfare of the community is unreservedly bound up with the due working 
of this industrial system, and therefore with its unreserved control by the engineers, who 
alone are competent to manage it. 
 
                        (Thorstein Veblen 1921, p. 44) 
 
The national economic contexts of Ireland and China in the autumn of 2011 are 
contrasting and different. China has now become the world’s largest exporting na-
tion and its economy (GDP) is second only to the United States in size, at $10 tril-
lion in 2010 figures.  The growth rate in GDP has been 8% or higher since the year 
2000.  On the other hand Ireland has a relatively small economy at $172 billion in 
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2010 figures, or just over 1% the size of the Chinese economy.  Despite recent years 
of prosperity that were characterised as a celtic tiger economy, Ireland went into 
recession in 2009 as a result of a collapse in the construction sector of its economy. 
In March 2009 Ireland’s economic rating was downgraded from AAA and within 
twenty months the Irish government requested a bailout from the International Mon-
etary Fund. One estimate puts Irish national debt currently at over €113 billion for a 
population of just under 4.5 million people, or €25,000 for every person in the coun-
try. Irish gross domestic product (GDP) has fallen each of the last three years.   
     From an Irish perspective, within the space of three short years what was origi-
nally characterised as a bank liquidity problem, evolved rapidly into a bank debt 
problem, progressed to a bank solvency problem and was to become a national debt 
problem when the Irish government guaranteed all Irish bank debt. It is currently 
now a national solvency issue because it is not clear that Ireland will be capable of 
repaying this debt (See, for example, Michael Lewis writing in Vanity Fair (Lewis 
2011)).  
     In Ireland, Irish political leadership allowed the banks and their risk taking to 
take control in such a way that the bank investors (bond holders) are guaranteed and 
thus able to walk away from the chaos financially protected while every Irish citizen 
is required to assume the total debt of the banks. Would a different class of leader-
ship, for example leadership by engineers, have done a better and more honest job of 
managing the economy? In 1921 Thorstein Veblen argued that the “material welfare 
of the community is unreservedly bound up with the due working of this industrial 
system, and therefore with its unreserved control by the engineers, who alone are 
competent to manage it” (Veblen 1921, p. 44). Perhaps because of the nature of 
engineering education – at its heart shaping forces to serve some end in an optimal 
manner – would engineers as leaders have acted more responsibly and demanded 
more accountability from our captains of finance? Here again Veblen makes the 
observation that “engineering begins and ends in the domain of tangible perfor-
mance, and that commercial expediency is another matter” (ibid. p. 47).  
      In a 2005 article Tenner wrote that “The argument that gained credence in 19th-
century France and was echoed in other regimes is that a state must be guided by a 
scientific and technological elite” (Tenner 2005). Certainly modern China would 
appear to provide a supporting example for Veblen’s thesis: the Chinese economy 
has developed steadily and the majority of its senior political leaders have been 
educated as engineers. This chapter sets out to explore whether it is the case that 
modern China, and in particular its leadership, embodies Veblen’s technocracy ar-
gument and is successful as a consequence; and that Ireland, lacking a discernable 
technocracy, has suffered as a consequence.  We suggest that France provides a 
western example of a moderating technocracy. 
 
 
Engineers, captains of finance and investment bankers 
 
From the perspective of a post-first-world-war economy – and the horrors of that 
conflict must be borne in mind when analyzing his thesis - Veblen observes that the 
industrial system had become a “system of interlocking mechanical processes” and 
“an organization of mechanical powers and material resources” and consequently it 
“lends itself to systematic control under the direction of industrial experts, skilled 
technologists, who may be called ‘production engineers’”. Veblen argues that the 
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system, indeed the material welfare of society (specifically “the material welfare of 
all the civilized peoples”) could only function at its best if it is run by engineers all 
working together harmoniously rather than at cross-purposes in an interdependent 
manner. “Politics and investment are still allowed to decide matters of industrial 
policy which should plainly be left to ... production engineers driven by no commer-
cial bias” (Veblen 1921, p.35). 
     Notwithstanding this, Veblen asserts that statesmen thwart this potential opti-
mality by working to the advantage of individual countries and likewise the captains 
of finance work at cross-purposes to an optimal system by colluding to benefit vest-
ed interests. “It is essential that that corps of technological specialists who by train-
ing, insight, and interest make up the general staff of industry must have a free hand 
in the disposal of its available resources, in materials, equipment, and man power, 
regardless of any national pretensions or any vested interests” (Veblen 1921, p.35).  
     Through the industrial revolution there was no separation or division required 
between industrial experts and those who managed the business. However with 
increasing complexity and specialization, “progressive differentiation” developed 
which served to delineate “those who designed and administered the industrial pro-
cesses from those others who designed and managed the commercial transactions”.   
     Because of increasing complexity, the industrial system came to a branch point 
with regard to how the system was developed and managed. Greater technical spe-
cialization was required to inform production decision making and this required 
special training, hands-on experience and a focus on technical issues. But by both 
achieving this training and focussing on technical issues, this ensured that the engi-
neers became the employees of the ‘captains of finance’ namely those whose role it 
was to manage the commercial aspects of industry.   
      
But gradually, with the passage of time and the advance of the industrial arts to a wider 
scope and a larger scale, and to an increasing specialization and standardization of pro-
cesses, the technological knowledge that makes up the state of the industrial arts has 
called for a higher degree of that training that makes industrial specialists; and at the 
same time any passably efficient management of industry has of necessity drawn on 
them and their special abilities to an ever-increasing extent.  
 
                        (Veblen 1921, p. 40)  
 
According to Veblen, technology is a “joint stock of knowledge and experience”.  
Consequently it requires “trained and instructed workmen” and also “a corps of 
highly trained and specially gifted experts”.  The development of the education 
system for these technical experts is described in the next section. 
     Veblen argues that, in turn, the captains of finance – disparagingly referred to as 
‘one-eyed captains of industry’ - lost control to investment bankers, in part because 
of the increasingly large scale of corporate enterprise and its necessary financial 
underwriting through securities. These investment bankers continue to control the 
technical experts. For our purposes we will characterise this as the expert reporting 
to the non-expert, a concept that we shall return to shortly. 
     Up to this point Veblen has developed the argument that without engineers the 
entire industrial system would grind to a halt and further, that the efficiency of en-
terprises is significantly compromised by the vested interests of commercial manag-
ers and investment bankers. Why then don’t engineers, the technical experts, organ-
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ize into a “self-directed working force”? According to Veblen, engineers have begun 
to become “class-conscious” in particular as they consider how inefficient the indus-
trial system is, a system of which they are an essential part, but which in no sense is 
managed for the optimal benefit or needs of the community. They already, but per-
haps not fully consciously nor collectively, understood that they controlled the 
mechanisms of productive industry. The educational system was broadly recognis-
ing and responding to the requirements to develop specialized training, acknowledg-
ing the importance of the engineers’ role. What then if they organised? However, 
before we can attempt to answer this we must take a step back and provide some 
context on how the world got to be where it was when Veblen was developing his 
thesis. 
 
 
The interconnectedness of the world economy 
 
The history of the world economy since the Industrial Revolution had been one of ac-
celerating technological progress, of continuous but uneven economic growth, and of 
increasing ‘globalisation’, that is to say of an increasingly elaborate and intricate 
worldwide division of labour; an increasingly dense network of flows and exchanges 
that bound every part of the world economy to the global system.  
 
(Hobsbawm 1994, p. 87)   
 
Let us review briefly how the world came to be so interconnected. In the latter half 
of the 19th century, years of industrial development together with free trade policy 
had greatly benefitted Britain. Its industrial growth had averaged 3 to 4 per cent per 
annum for most of the century. The outcome of which was that the United Kingdom 
was the most highly industrialized country in the world. “British export performance 
in engineering machinery, textiles, iron and steel and coal” made its balance of 
payments positive, despite the fact that imports of food and raw materials were 
growing at a faster rate than exports (Robbins 1983). But even at the height of em-
pire, concerns were increasing that technology was mobile and according to Robbins 
that a “distinctive set of circumstances had produced an industrial revolution in 
Britain – but it could occur elsewhere. Techniques of production could be mastered 
by foreigners and there was no reason why they could not improve upon British 
inventions”. As one example, in 1879 Britain produced more steel than the rest of 
Europe combined. By 1886 the USA had surpassed Britain, followed by Germany 
surpassing Britain in 1893. Over this period British steel manufacturing continued to 
grow. But the continued growth in British steel masked the underlying global eco-
nomic shifts that were taking place. Consolidation and concentration became more 
frequent within British industry as companies tried to leverage economies of scale 
and compete against external competition.   
     By the 4th quarter of the 19th century the United States was booming. During this 
period many significant technical inventions originated in the USA such as machine 
tools, the telephone, electrical generation and distribution, and home products such 
as Singer sewing machines, Yale locks and the typewriter. Bryson has captured this 
era very well when he writes “Europeans viewed America’s industrial ambitions 
with amusement, then consternation and finally alarm. In Britain, a National Effi-
ciency Movement arose with the idea of recapturing the bulldog spirit that had for-
merly made Britain pre-eminent. Books with titles like The American Invaders and 
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The ‘American Commercial Invasion’ of Europe sold briskly. But actually what 
Europeans were seeing was only the beginning” (Bryson 2010, p. 313). What in fact 
was occurring was the inexorable shift of economic power and dominance from 
Great Britain to the United States.   
     Events at the end of the 19th century have resonances with the economic situation 
that opened our chapter. In 1890 the British investment bank, Baring Brothers, over-
extended itself through bonds to finance Latin American debt and required rescue by 
the Bank of England.1 British banks invested heavily overseas in this period with no 
government interference. The British Government saw its role as trying to ensure 
fair competition for British business and pursued Free Trade to that end, even when 
it was clear that British interests were suffering to the ideal of free trade and British 
bank investments in other countries (Robbins 1983).   
    In tandem with the technological developments in the United States was the edu-
cation of engineers and technologists. This was necessary as the United States had 
pioneered the systematic organization of mass production and skilled engineers were 
required for factories engaged in design, development and production using scien-
tific principles.   
     We arrive at a crossroads. As Veblen wrote, the Great War – the war to end all 
wars – is over. The boundaries of empires are being re-drawn at the Paris Peace 
Conference in 19192. Monarchies are in upheaval and new political regimes are on 
the rise. The industrial revolution has yielded to industrialisation and increasingly 
complex manufacturing processes. The education system is transforming in re-
sponse. The education of engineers occurs in elite schools. The profession is organ-
ising. Has the hour of the Engineer as Leader finally arrived? 
 
 
Economic collapse 
      
It was not to be. The inter-war years were to prove decisively negative for capitalist 
economies. In describing these years as the age of catastrophe, Hobsbawm (1994) 
has written that “a world economic crisis of unprecedented depth brought even the 
strongest capitalist economies to their knees and seemed to reverse the creation of a 
single universal world economy, which had been so remarkable an achievement of 
nineteenth-century liberal capitalism”  (Hobsbawm 1994, p. 7). In short, integration 
and globalisation of the economies of the world retreated from the outbreak of the 
First World War. Population migration slowed considerably over this period. “Be-
tween 1927 and 1933 international lending dropped by over 90 per cent.  ...  Each 
state now did its best to protect its economy against threats from outside, that is to 
say against a world economy that was visibly in major trouble” (Hobsbawm 1994, p. 
89).   
                                                     
 
1 One hundred years later in 1995, the company collapsed through futures trading within the space of a 
single weekend.   
2 Of interest, a small country called Ireland made representations in Paris to have its sovereignty recog-
nized by the great powers. This recognition was not forthcoming and Ireland went through a war of 
independence followed by a civil war both of which occurred while Veblen was writing “The Engineers 
and the Price System”.  
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     The end of the Great War provided a temporary boom, but this was short-lived as 
countries like Great Britain sought to handle approximately 3 million demobilised 
service men. Unions saw their power increase. However “prices and the boom col-
lapsed in 1920. This undermined the power of labour – British unemployment never 
thereafter fell much below 10 per cent and the unions lost half their members over 
the next twelve years – thus once again tilting the balance firmly towards the em-
ployers”  (Hobsbawm 1994, p. 89). The monetary system collapsed with western 
countries deflating their currencies in attempts to regain stability. Germany’s cur-
rency became worthless resulting in its industry becoming starved of working capi-
tal and the country relied increasingly on foreign loans. Combined with the burden 
of £22 billion in war reparations Germany was required to repay under the Treaty of 
Versailles. This created economic conditions that made Germany receptive to fas-
cism. 3  
     Post-war unemployment in most of Western Europe remained extremely high.  
Unemployment was more controlled in the Soviet Union. Prices for goods continued 
to collapse, even with stockpiling in attempts to maintain price stability. Industrial 
output capacity was greater than markets could consume. “At a time when world 
trade fell by 60 per cent in four years (1929 – 1932), states found themselves build-
ing increasingly high barriers to protect their national markets and currencies against 
the world economic hurricanes, knowing quite well that this meant the dismantling 
of the world system of multilateral trade on which, they believed, world prosperity 
must rest.” “In a single sentence: the Great Slump destroyed economic liberalism for 
half a century” (Hobsbawm 1994, pp. 94-95).   
     Here then is a rationale for the failure of engineers to assume the leadership role 
argued for by Veblen. The engineers were in a position to optimise efficiency and 
output at exactly the time when such efficiency and output were counterproductive 
given the collapse of global trade that was occurring in the world. Consequently, in 
western capitalist economies, industrial leadership remained with those who con-
trolled output and prices, identified by Veblen as the investment bankers. Experts 
continued to be managed by non-experts.   
 
 
The education of engineers in Europe and the US 
 
A brief recall of early developments in engineering education in France and other 
European countries on the one hand and England and the United States on the other, 
is important in contextualising the emergence of the engineering profession in Eu-
rope and the United States. Context and comparison with the education of engineers 
in China is addressed in the ensuing section. The emergence and advancement of 
engineering education through the 18th and 19th centuries is well documented, with 
scholarly contributions of pivotal historical developments in France, Germany, Eng-
land, the United States and other western countries (see for example Lundgreen 
1990, Belhoste 2007, Gispen 1990).  
     During the period of the Ancien Régime (Old Order) - primarily referring to the 
aristocratic, social and political system established in France from the 15th to the 18th 
                                                     
 
3 Germany fully cleared its First World War debt in 2010 when it made its final payment under the Treaty 
of Versailles. 
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century, and up to (and arguably beyond) the French Revolution the word ingénieur 
was synonymous with a state engineer. France had become a centralised state with a 
strong public service. Various corps of state engineers attained an unrivalled posi-
tion in French society; “As engineers they lent technical expertise to non-juridical 
matters of public policy; as state engineers they rendered administrative services 
and represented true civil servants in the sense of functionnaires, while public law-
yers lacked this degree of loyalty and ascendency” (Lundgreen 1990, p. 37). From 
its foundation in 1794, the École Polytechnique served as a preparatory school for 
all state corps. In addition to a solid underpinning in mathematics and science-based 
subjects, French state engineering graduates were tutored and oriented for careers as 
state administrators. 
     The establishment of the École des Ponts et Chaussées in France in 1747 may be 
considered the foundation platform for delivery of formal engineering education in 
Europe. As described in Bucciarelli et al. (2009), students enjoyed the privilege of 
being state employees whilst receiving a project-centric education under the tutelage 
of savant professors of the corps. The latter half of the 18th-century saw the creation 
of further écoles, including the École des Mines (1783), the École de Travaux Public 
(1794) – later retitled the École Polytechnique, with mission for provision of ‘a high 
intellectual and scientific formation’. This was followed by the École Centrale des 
Arts et Manufactures (1829), offering a more industrial-based education.  
     The term ingénieur was also adopted in Germany in the 19th and 20th centuries, 
with primary emphasis on military engineering careers. Although there were histori-
cal variations in development and orientation when compared to the French model, a 
similar trend arose through establishment of academies such as the Prussian 
Bauakademie in 1799, providing training for state engineers who served the state 
through projects and tasks including mining, public works and construction of public 
buildings and public enterprise projects (Lundgreen 1990). 
     Formalized engineering education in the United Kingdom had its origin with the 
establishment of the Royal Engineering School at Chatham in 1812. In the United 
States, the Rensselaer School in upstate New York opened in 1823. In Germany, the 
Karlsruhe Polytechnische Schule commenced student training in 1825. In Ireland 
the first Professor of Engineering was appointed in Trinity College Dublin in 1841, 
while applied technological education commenced with the establishment in 1887 of 
Kevin Street Technical School, the founding nucleus of Dublin Institute of Technol-
ogy.   
     In the early years of the 20th century, as would be professionals, “German engi-
neers found themselves on the dividing line between the capitalist industry and the 
old order. With the exception of certain subgroups, engineers never fully succeeded 
in becoming fully part of either world and ended up being squeezed mercilessly 
between the two”. Gispen considers that the engineers’ socio-political failure was 
related to Germany’s industrial successes in the second half of the nineteenth centu-
ry. “The rift separating Technik from Bildung and Besitz became so deep in Germa-
ny that engineers were forced to develop something of a counterculture and compete 
rather than amalgamate with the dominant social order” (Gispen 1990, p. 2). 
     In his review of engineering education in Europe and the US in the 18th and 19th 
centuries, Lundgreen’s  study on the emergence of “school culture and the engineer-
ing profession”, proffers that the latter part of the 19th-century was a “major divide 
in time” in the formation and identity of education across the western world. “The 
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rise to dominance of school culture in engineering education took place much later 
in England and the U.S.A. than in France or Germany.” (Lundgreen1990, p. 1). 
     The model of engineering education and early formation in England, Ireland and 
the US had common traits but differed to those of France, and by extension to Ger-
many and other countries in continental Europe. The UK and Ireland developed no 
elite technical schools, but the education of engineers was taken up by the existing 
universities. Technical schools were opened towards the end of the 19th century but 
these developed from the perspective of trades and craft – hands-on engineering – 
and were not intended to produce elite graduates to assume leadership roles. Broadly 
in Ireland, England and the United States, there was no corps of public lawyers nor 
of state engineers (apart from the military) existing which could have provided a 
role model for civil (meaning ”civilian”) engineers; with no institutional provision 
for technical training of engineers in the 18th and 19th centuries. Nor was there insti-
tutional training for other professions; universities were essentially liberal arts col-
leges and schools of divinity. To become a lawyer or physician, with or without 
college education, one had to be apprenticed. However, professional societies, 
through a recruitment policy of co-option, provided and “reinforced the network of 
relationships between pupils and masters”. Harvard and Yale were both established 
in 1847 as schools of applied science, however with greater focus on scientific edu-
cation than technology. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) was cre-
ated in 1860 with a strategy based on a perceived need of a more technologically 
applied focused education to that offered by Harvard (Wickenden 1929). 
     It was only in the latter half of the 19th-century that engineering education in the 
UK was underpinned by programmes in science and engineering through institutes 
of higher learning (Bucciarelli et al. 2009). Professional engineering bodies had also 
emerged as custodians of professional training and accreditation in engineering, for 
example the Institution of Civil Engineers set examinations for qualification of 
membership to the institution. Coming forward to the mid 20th-century, during the 
1940s and 1950s the Rensselaer School in New York subsequently developed along 
the lines of the Polytechnic, in particular the École Centrale des Arts de Manufac-
tures (Wickenden 1929). In this model it is interesting to note that students received 
tuition in the humanities in addition to their core engineering and scientific studies. 
Enhanced education in the humanities and social sciences in undergraduate engi-
neering education was advanced with the release of the Grinter Report on the Evalu-
ation of Engineering Education (ASEE Report 1956). Grinter acknowledged that 
many engineers progressed into “managerial and top executive positions in industry 
and government” and that the “foundation should be laid for an understanding of 
human relationships, the principles of economics and government, and other fields 
upon which the engineering manager can build”.   
     The growth and spread of engineering professional organisations occurred in 
tandem with the establishment of engineering schools throughout the western world 
in the 19th and 20th centuries and continues today.  The Accreditation Board for 
Engineering and Technology (ABET) sets the standard and curriculum content for 
engineering and technology programmes in the US. In the UK the Engineering 
Council is the coordinating body for a host of professional organisations with disci-
pline specific mission. In Ireland, Engineers Ireland is the national institution with 
responsibility for advancement and accreditation of the engineering profession in 
Ireland. The Washington Accord (1989), Dublin Accord (2002) and Sydney Accord 
(2001) are international agreements among bodies responsible for accrediting engi-
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neering, technology and technician titles. Under the auspices of FEANI (Fédération 
Européenne d'Associations Nationales d'Ingénieur), the European Accredited Engi-
neer label EUR-ACE was established in 2004 to facilitate accreditation and coordi-
nation of standards in engineering programmes throughout the European Union and 
beyond its boundaries.  
     Such organisations promote worldwide harmonisation and acceptance through 
professional recognition of engineering programmes, providing global networking 
and recognition of the engineering profession. In addition to core staff in the nation-
al organisations, volunteer chartered and professional engineers make significant 
contributions through engagement as committee members and as mentors and advi-
sors to those seeking professional status. The institutions also offer a voice to the 
members of the profession at national level and on the international stage.  
 
 
Engineering leadership in Europe and the United States 
 
In Ireland, England and the United States the professionalization of engineering and 
engineering education fostered a professional developmental channel that diverted 
engineers away from strictly technology management roles. As noted also by Ten-
ner, “at the turn of the 20th century, U.S. companies fearing manpower shortages 
resisted attempts to make elite postgraduate degrees the norm for engineers, as they 
were becoming for lawyers, doctors and executives” (Tenner 2005). Thus for these 
countries, the lack of elite academies for engineering education, combined with 
industry pressures to ensure an adequate supply of engineers contributed to the flow 
of engineers into industry and not into other leadership roles in Ireland, England and 
the United States.   
    It is also sometimes argued that engineers, by their education, are blinkered to 
examine only the technical problem before them and consequently do not see other 
contextual dimensions, such as societal dimensions, and so whilst they may have 
optimal solutions they are only optimal with respect to the technical factors they 
take into account. In discussing the lack of engineers in political leadership roles 
within the United States, Tenner goes further than this and notes that one explana-
tion may be that engineers “self-select for social distance” and provides anecdotal 
examples in support of this theory. Interestingly, Tenner refers back to Veblen when 
he writes “This is an old American stereotype. ... Veblen, championing what was 
later called technocracy, wrote that “the public considered engineers a somewhat 
fantastic brotherhood of overspecialized cranks, not to be trusted out of sight except 
under the restraining hand of safe and sane businessmen”. He added, “Nor are the 
technicians themselves in the habit of taking a greatly different view of their own 
case” (Tenner 1995).  
     While commenting in passing that a mix of talented people is ideally what is 
needed within the context of leadership, nonetheless in Ireland, England and the 
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United States the task should be to get sufficient numbers of engineers into roles 
wherein they can interact with and influence other decision-makers4. 
 
 
The development of the role of the engineer in China 
 
Let us return now to the question of whether China provides a supporting example 
for Veblen’s thesis that engineers are best positioned to manage the material welfare 
of the community? Joel Andreas begins his brilliant study of modern leadership in 
China with the simple statement that “China today is ruled by Red engineers” (An-
dreas 2009, p. 1). This runs counter to the Marxist vision of a classless society, de-
spite the fact that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) adopted a Marxist version of 
socialism. According to Andreas, the CCP was founded by intellectuals but during 
two decades of armed insurrection it became a party of peasants, which resulted in a 
rise in peasant leadership. During the early years of communist control in China 
after the 1949 Revolution, collectivization eliminated private ownership of land and 
the state took control of large enterprises, with small enterprises being combined 
into cooperatives.   
     While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to examine the Great Leap Forward 
from 1958 to 1961 and the subsequent Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976, what 
is important to our work is that it was the subsequent reaction to the Cultural Revo-
lution that resulted in the creation of a new dominant class led by engineers.  Andre-
as makes the observation that “Mao was completely unsympathetic with intellectu-
als’ conviction that their expertise made them more fit to run the country than the 
communists.” But with Deng Xiaoping’s return to power after the death of Mao 
Zedong, it was those people who were educated at elite technical universities and 
there received their technical and political training who began moving into positions 
of power (Andreas 2009). It was at these elite technical universities that they became 
both Red (political training) and Expert (studying engineering as an educational 
discipline). To understand the rise of engineers to dominant leadership positions, it 
is therefore necessary to understand what it meant to be both Red and Expert.   
     Consider first the Chinese Communist Party. Founded in 1921, the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) is the ruling political party of the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC). The CCP maintains a unitary government centralising the state, mili-
tary, and media. The legal power of the Communist Party is guaranteed by the PRC 
constitution. The CCP is the world's largest political party, claiming nearly 78 mil-
lion members at the end of 2009 which constitutes about 5.6% of the total popula-
tion of China. The CCP is a strongly hierarchical organisation. From the age of nine, 
children can join the Young Pioneers which is run by the Communist Youth League. 
At age fifteen, young people can join the Youth League. The Youth League, in turn, 
is run by the CCP and people can join the CCP at age eighteen.  According to An-
                                                     
 
4 Given the collapse of the world economic system in the late 1920’s, the argument can be made that had 
engineers been solely in charge of optimizing industrial output, as argued for by Veblen, then engineers 
might well have made matters worse by increasing output into deflating national economies.  
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dreas, this is an increasingly selective hierarchy with more intense competition to 
gain membership of the Youth League and then the CCP itself5. 
     Likewise the Chinese education system was hierarchical and selective. In its first 
decade of power, the CCP reorganised the school system making it increasingly 
more difficult to progress from primary school to junior middle school, hence to 
senior middle school and then on to college. This created tremendous competition 
among students for increasingly limited numbers of places as they progressed 
through the education system.   
     In order to support a program of rapid industrialization, higher education was 
reorganised along a Soviet model with colleges assigned a specialized teaching 
mission aligned to a narrow range of disciplines. This facilitated a system to produce 
large numbers of highly specialized engineers. According to Andreas, between 1947 
and 1965 the number of Chinese university students grew by a factor of five (from 
130,715 to 644,885) while the number of engineering students grew by a factor of 
twelve (from 23,035 to 292,680). During the Great Leap Forward (1958 – 1961) the 
Chinese also adapted the Soviet educational model to combine specialized teaching 
with research and production as elements of the university education, which was 
retained after the failure of the Great Leap Forward. Universities such as Tsinghua 
continued to stress the importance of hands-on learning and ensured that its students 
learned technique rather than simply engaging in manual labour as part of the cur-
riculum.   
     The CCP “created a highly centralized, hierarchical and meritocratic education 
system” while at the same time it was “resolutely committed to eliminating class 
differences based on education”.  This paradox caused difficulties in the period 
between the 1949 Revolution and the Cultural Revolution in 1966.  The CCP used 
slogans such as politics takes command to argue that experts should be subordinated 
to political leaders. But the reality was that “poorly educated Communist officials 
were attempting to supervise non-Communist experts” so that despite having author-
ity they lacked technical understanding to provide leadership. While at a micro level 
we can characterise this in a Veblen-style argument that experts were being man-
aged by non-experts, at a macro level the Great Leap Forward was a disaster for 
China as the attempted expansion of its industrialisation failed and millions starved 
to death.   
     To address this problem the CCP realized that the “long-term solution was to 
train a new generation of cadres who had expertise and were also committed Com-
munists, that is, cadres who were both Red and expert” (Andreas 2009, p. 50). As 
recounted by Andreas, in 1958 the President of Tsinghua University, Jiang Nan-
                                                     
 
5 The primary organization of power in the CCP comprises the Central Committee which includes (a) the 
Politburo Standing Committee, which currently consists of nine members; (b) the Politburo, consisting of 
24 full members (including the members of the Politburo Standing Committee) and one alternate; (c) the 
Secretariat, the principal administrative mechanism of the CCP, headed by the General Secretary of the 
Communist Party of China; and (d) the Central Military Commission (a parallel organization of the 
government institution of the same name).  The Central Committee has approximately 370 members, 
including ministers and senior officials in Beijing and leaders of provincial governments and cities in 
addition to senior military personnel.  The current membership of the Politburo Standing Committee 
includes Hu Jintao, President of the Peoples Republic of China and Chairman of the PRC Central Military 
Commission, and eight senior party members.   
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xiang, addressed the collected students and teachers of the university and said: “Our 
requirement for training cadres is that they become both Red and expert. If you are 
not thoroughly Red and deeply expert, that is a huge waste”.  Seven years later in 
1965 Jiang addressed the incoming students to Tsinghua and told them that in the 
future China would be run by engineers, and that since Tsinghua was the leading 
engineering school in China, it was likely that some of these incoming students 
would become national leaders. Later in 1978, after Deng Xiaoping came to power 
and was rehabilitated, Jiang was appointed Minister for Higher Education. Finally in 
1980 Deng himself addressed the assembled body of Tsinghua University and de-
clared that “expertise does not equal Redness, but Reds must be experts.” This 
spelled the end of the class-levelling aspects of Mao’s policies and established a new 
class who held both Red and expert credentials and who were rapidly promoted into 
leadership positions. A significant feature of the CCP’s Politburo Standing Commit-
tee today is that eight of the nine elected senior officials trained as engineers. This 
contrasts with the largely legal profession political leadership in both Europe and the 
US. 
     The result of the political and educational structures established was that CCP 
members who were students in elite technical universities had come successfully 
through two separate, distinct and rigorous selection processes: one to gain member-
ship of the CCP and one to become a student at an elite technical university.  Andre-
as also notes that job assignments for graduates corresponded with the rank of the 
university and so graduates from top-ranked universities such as Tsinghua Universi-
ty in Beijing “received prized assignments in national and provincial government 
offices, industrial ministries, large industrial enterprises, research institutes and 
universities”. This of course was possible because of the collectivization policies 
implemented after the Revolution in 1949 allowing the government to place whom-
ever it wanted wherever it wanted across the industrial sphere. From the perspective 
of Veblen, this is a centralised version of the engineers-in-control that he advocated.  
Therefore these graduates had the additional characteristic of post-university roles 
that provided them with considerable responsibility and experience. It is interesting 
to note here the strong parallels with the “selection, streaming and differentiated 
experience” discussed at length by Gladwell in his popular book Outliers to explain 
those people who become successful in sports and which Gladwell uses to set the 
framework for success in other human endeavours (Gladwell 2008).   
     A transformation in ideological thinking occurred in the post-Mao period as a 
logical consequence of accepting the requirements to be both Red and expert. Dur-
ing the Mao era, party leaders were not university educated, but instead came from 
the ranks of the masses. Post-Mao, Red and Expert meant that engineers were now 
considered to have the best qualifications to be administrative and political leaders 
and this has naturally resulted in people educated as engineers discharging non-
engineering roles.     
     In addition to coming successfully through the two separate rigorous selection 
processes of education and CCP membership, followed by prized government roles 
for graduates, these graduates also benefitted from maintaining a network of fellow 
graduates from elite Chinese universities. This is particularly true of Tsinghua Uni-
versity. As Li notes, “Indeed, there is no more telling example of the role of a school 
network in the rise of technocratic elites in post-Mao China than in this institution” 
(Li 1994, p. 2).   
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     A further significant advantage enjoyed by CCP members who graduated in en-
gineering from elite universities was the school networks they developed and main-
tained. Writing in 1994 Li noted the importance of political networks developed at 
Tsinghua University: “Some China experts believe that technocratic elites lack close 
interpersonal ties or political networks, and that technocrats come to power mainly 
because of their technical expertise. Yet a careful analysis of the biographical back-
grounds of Qinghua technocrats shows that their political networks at Qinghua are 
more important than technical expertise for explaining their success in acquiring 
leadership posts” (Li 1994, p. 2). In echoing what has had been said of elite schools 
in other countries such as Harvard or Yale, Li states that “belonging to an elite 
school network is far more essential for politicians than having an elite university 
degree. Intelligence and skills facilitate career advancement, but connections, or 
guanxi, are what really count” (ibid, p. 2-3). 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter began with a brief comparison of the relative position of two very dif-
ferent economies, those of Ireland and China in 2011. We asked the hypothetical 
question: What if Ireland had been lead by engineers, would it have avoided the 
difficulties it now faces? To provide a framework to examine the role of engineering 
leadership we took as our starting point the arguments developed by Thorstein Veb-
len that engineers were ideally positioned to assume and assert greater control over 
the mechanisms of production. However Veblen wrote in 1921 just after the Great 
War and this turned out to be a critically important period in global economic devel-
opment. For what occurred in the 1920’s – and has subsequently been characterised 
as the period between the two world wars – was an economic collapse on a global 
scale. This collapse fundamentally re-shaped the remainder of the 20th century, in-
cluding the possibility of an enhanced role for engineers in leadership roles. 
     We have seen that a system evolved in Ireland in which there are no elite engi-
neering academies, and no mechanisms to ensure a steady stream of highly qualified 
engineers into key leadership and influencing positions6. This contrasts directly with 
China wherein the CCP afforded status to engineers and scientists, and the combina-
tion of membership in the CCP, access to elite engineering universities, key gov-
ernment roles after graduation and the support of old school networks all combined 
                                                     
 
6 There are exceptions to the rule. Looking back over several decades at deputy and ministerial posts in 
the Irish Parliament there is perhaps only one entry of a senior ministerial post held by an internationally 
renowned engineering academic. Tribute was paid by UNESCO-IHE Institute for Water Education in 
August 2008 upon the death of Professor James Clement Dooge: 
‘Professor Dooge (1992-2010) was an Irish hydrologist, politician, engineer and academic. He lived a 
multifaceted existence with his roles including a period as Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Chairman of 
the Irish Senate, President of the International Council for Science, President of the International Associa-
tion of Hydrological Sciences and Professor of Hydrology at Dublin University. He had a significant role 
in the development of the European Union during the Irish presidency of 1984’ (UNESCO-IHE). 
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to ensure that engineers dominate political and industrial leadership in modern Chi-
na.  
     However, there is a critical point to be made with regards to China and its devel-
opment and which links back to the framework for this chapter. First, other eastern 
European communist states adopted a technocratic leadership regime. To achieve 
this they re-structured their higher education system into specialised schools. What 
China did differently, is that it reacted against Mao and the Great Leap Forward, 
which attempted to make experts (i.e., engineers) subservient to Reds (i.e., political 
party cadres). When the Great Leap Forward failed spectacularly with estimated 
millions upon millions of people dead, China moved to implement a meritocracy 
combined with a technocratic, centrally-controlled party leadership regime. It was 
the meritocracy combined with the highly competitive and highly selective system 
that ensured that only those people who were capable of getting through the rigorous 
party selection process and succeeding in the leading engineering universities such 
as Tsinghua University ended up in key government-designated jobs.  
     Perhaps Cheng Li (1994) captures the point best and links it back to Veblen as 
follows. “In the classic writings on technocracy, technocrats are usually portrayed as 
people who are interested not in power but in technical matters. They are selected 
not because of their political associations but because of their technical expertise.  
China’s experience is different”.  Li goes on to argue that “The selection of Chinese 
technocrats, therefore, is not based on criteria which are universalistic, scientific-
technical, or impersonal, but is conditioned by the political and institutional network 
through which they have been promoted. China is entering a new era in its century-
long modernization process. A new generation of leadership, a technocratic elite, is 
moving toward the centre stage of Chinese politics” (Li 1994). 
     What China appears to have proved (perhaps inadvertently) was that a Marxist 
classless society could not succeed if that society wished to be a successful industri-
alized nation. The reason is that technocrats must be capable of exercising the skills 
that they have developed through their education and be empowered to manage 
those without such skills. Mao saw the experts as a class of intellectuals - and he 
fought hard to suppress them and ensure that the CCP was not controlled by them, 
and indeed that uneducated peasant cadres were in charge of production. This is 
Veblen again, but from a different perspective. Veblen argued that it was the one-
eyed “captains of industry” to blame, and then the investment bankers. But substi-
tute “non-expert party cadres” for captains of industry and Veblen’s argument is 
made from a Chinese perspective. Therefore it is in modern China that we find evi-
dence of Veblen’s central argument.  
     The situations in each country are unique to that country and it would be unwise 
to draw generalisations from their individual circumstances. For example, in China 
the authoritarian, single party system was a necessary ingredient because it ensured 
that the system was implemented; and collectivization ensured that the engineering 
graduates received important industry and government jobs. This worked in China 
and for China at a particular point in its history, but even now it is changing as more 
non-engineers move into positions of power and the privatization of assets continues 
in China. But if one were to generalise, a hybrid environment blending meritocracy 
with technocratic leadership moderated by non-engineering influences might well be 
the recipe for a successful country. 
     One question that remains as we close this chapter: are there parallels between 
the shift in economic power from the United Kingdom to the United States at the 
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end of the 19th century to the shift in economic power from the United States to 
China at the start of the 21st century? Further, given the current global economic 
difficulties which exist, particularly in the United States and Euro-zone countries, 
are there parallels with the Great Depression of 1929 – 1933? 
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